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Abstract 
In the last decade of the past century, the Romanian economy had registered suboptimal economic performances characterized 
by severe declines in the GDP, huge losses of the state-owned companies and gigantic inter-enterprise arrears that accounted 
for over 35% of Romania’s GDP. The restructuring process of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in Romania started in 1993 
with a massive exercise that included more than 400 SOE (state-owned-companies) amid on the following patterns: "top-
down" approach and  a „pre-privatization restructuring” preceded and joined by a substantial specific legislative framework 
.This first wave has been followed by a second wave starting from 2001 that included a limited number of companies but of 
higher value and impact on the economy (biggest banks, big industrial and energy companies, former regies autonomes etc.) 
The second wave of restructuring meant a change of paradigm for companies in need of restructuring, developed in two 
important stages, when  SOE were listed at the stock exchange, privatized or  placed in a „stand-by” process in order to be 
restructured. Thus, the methodology of restructuring in the second wave has been retooled and correlated with the evolution 
of the macroeconomic conditions and agreements with IFI's. The EBRD index of privatization show a direct relation between 
the two waves, as Romania received a higher value for this index as it moved to next level of restructuring and privatization.  
 
© 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer review under responsibility of Emerging Markets Queries 
in Finance and Business local organization. 
 
Keywords: restructuring; liquidation; corporate governance; privatization; economic crisis 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +40 213-119-790. 
E-mail address: dandpopescu@yahoo.com. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Asociatia Grupul Roman de Cercetari in Finante Corporatiste
1290   Dumitru Dan Popescu and Costin Ciora /  Procedia Economics and Finance  32 ( 2015 )  1289 – 1304 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to underpin the correlation between the restructuring results, followed by 
privatization and the impact on macroeconomic figures. Moreover, in this research we developed the foundation 
of analyzing the evolution of the restructuring process of the most important companies in Romania. We studied 
the effects on a limited and representative number of companies from the first wave and selective cases of 
companies from the second wave, and measured the impact of restructuring actions as well as methodological 
aspects incurred. A key result is that the effects of restructuring in both waves are positive, which provides 
evidence in support of the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, while at the same time some relevance of 
the efficient-structure hypothesis cannot be rejected. The paper concludes with some remarks on the practicality 
and implementation of the findings. The purpose of this paper was three-fold: 
• to improve the Restructuring Process Analysis by a better segregation of the last twenty years of 
continuous Restructuring Programs of Romanian economy; 
• to underpin the correlation between the restructuring results, followed by privatization and the impact 
on macroeconomic figures that will allow to have a better and more accurate picture of the effectiveness of 
numerous restructuring programs that have been developed over the last twenty years; 
• and last but not least, in this research we developed the foundation of analyzing the evolution of the 
restructuring process of the most important companies in Romania. We studied the effects on a limited and 
representative number of companies from the first wave and selective cases of companies from the second wave, 
and measured the impact of restructuring actions as well as methodological aspects incurred. 
2. Literature review 
Frydman, Rapaczynski et all (1993) – discussed about legal and ownership structure, institutions for state 
regulation, overview of privatization process and the initial transformation of enterprises. Some authors refer to 
transition economies in the early stages of transformation as a “weakly structured market economy” (Dobrescu 
1996) or a “previously centrally planned economy” ( Calvo and Fenkel 1991). Grosfeld and Senik (1996) They 
were thinking that the change of ownership was a necessary and a sufficient condition of capitalism. The literature 
on financial repression and financial reform provides a thorough macroeconomic link between the development 
of financial markets and economic growth (Fry 1982, 1993, 1995, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1992, Rayon 1994, 
Chang 1994). The need for a closer analysis of the microeconomic roots of financial repression, however, is a 
new approach in the studies of financial markets in developing and transition economies (Amrit-Poser 1996, 
Popa 1998). Nicolescu et all (1996) – developed the” efficiency-based” restructuring concept and Crum and 
Goldberg (1998) – analyzed restructuring as a complex set of decisive measures in order to increase 
competitiveness. The inter-enterprise arrears, as well as the bank, tax and wage arrears phenomena provide a 
good example of a microeconomic problem in the financial markets of Romania . The accumulation of inter-
enterprise arrears can also cause inflation. Monetary control can be defeated by firms that circumvent a tight 
credit market by creating their own liquidity through trade credits (e.g. Daianu,1994) .Credit and liquidity 
constraints affect indiscriminately viable and non-viable businesses, or, even worse, create adverse selection 
effects – artificially sustaining large loss-makers and preventing new private firms from developing profitable 
investment projects (see Berglöf and Roland 1997 and 1998). 
As shown in Croitoru and Schaffer (2000) for the case of tax arrears, an increasing real gross arrears aggregate 
would be a sign that more and more firms are running into arrears. In Romania’s case, the commitment of the 
government to economic reforms by liquidating inefficient firms Stiglitz (1994, p. 238) would have extended 
mainly to state-run utility companies because they were the biggest actors in accumulating enterprise arrears 
(Santarossa, 2001; OECD, 2002). Bowman and Singh (1999) classified restructuring activities into three 
categories namely portfolio restructuring, financial restructuring and organizational restructuring. Kornai (2000) 
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considers that the pre-privatization restructuring serves as a useful screening device in order to interest private 
investors, who buy the firms. Debande and Friebel (2004) advocates for the firmly reestablishing of the State 
control of SOE cause it avoids that (unproductive) managers abuse and divert capital or funds which are for 
restructuring. Djankov (1998) - selected a sample of Romanian companies from the period 1992-1996. He 
concludes that isolating programs have delayed restructuring imposing budget constraints on loss-making 
enterprises. On the other hand Djankov (1999) – studies the relation between ownership structure and enterprise 
performance in newly independent states: Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Russia. He 
concluded that non-linear analysis showed some significant relation between different types of ownership and 
enterprise restructuring. Fidrmucova (2000) made an analysis on channels of restructuring on a panel of Czech 
companies and found that investment is not a significant determinant of enterprise performance.  Koh, Dai & 
Chang (2010) – examined the impact of lifecycles on restructuring strategies. Distress firm’s access to different 
types of restructuring strategies is limited by the lifecycle stage they are in. Frydman, Hessel & Rapaczynski 
(2001) – followed the entrepreneurship and restructuring of enterprises in Central Europe (Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland) and explained the market impact of ownership on firm performance.Sterman (2002) 
analyzed restructuring as diverse activities such as divestiture of under-performing business, spin-offs, 
acquisitions, stock repurchases and debt swaps. Gibbs P.A. (2007) considers that restructuring means changes in 
the operational structure, investment structure, financing structure and governance structure of a company.  
3. A view of restructuring 
In the last decade of the past century, the Romanian economy had registered suboptimal economic 
performances characterized by severe declines in the GDP, huge losses of the state-owned companies and 
gigantic inter-enterprise arrears that accounted for over 35% of Romania’s GDP.  In this circumstances Romania 
started the Restructuring Process that dominated the transformation of Romanian economy in the last twenty 
years.  
Fig. 1. New paradigm of the second wave of restructuring 
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Fig. 2. Production process – stage 1 
 
This process can be structured in two waves with two stages each as follows. The FIRST WAVE (FW) started 
in 1993 known as the “Large-scale corporate and financial restructuring process” and consisted in two stages:  
• a first stage of two exercises: a pilot program of 30 companies followed by a more systematic exercise 
that included in excess of 400 companies and regies autonomes focused on a “top-down” model of restructuring 
that was finalized with notable results 1993-1995. 
• second stage (for accurate quantification of restructuring results purposes) known as “LARGE-SCALE 
PRIVATIZATION”(OWNERSHIP RESTRUCTURING” 1996-2000; 
The SECOND WAVE (SW) started in 2001 and consisted in two stages as well:  
• first stage 2001-2009 dedicated exclusively to the ownership restructuring (privatization) of SME’s and 
few large-sized companies  through direct sale and initiated sale through IPO on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. 
• second stage 2010-2013  that included three main categories : SOE for Stock Exchange listing 
(Nuclearelectrica, Romgaz, Transelectrica, Fondul Proprietatea, Transgaz etc., SOE for privatization and Special 
cases (Hidroelectrica, Oltchim, CFR Marfa etc). 
 
It has to be mentioned that the First Stage of the FW “Large-scale corporate and financial restructuring 
process”  has been developed on the “pre-privatization-”principle with the aim at turning around viable 
corporations, liquidate nonviable ones, restore the health of the financial sector and create the conditions for long-
term economic growth and  involved changes in corporate governance, organizational structure, management, 
labor, capital, technology, output, and sales for better positioning the companies for  the last component of 
restructuring process-ownership restructuring (privatization). A comprehensive strategy and methodology for 
restructuring, encompassing both the corporate and financial sectors, was put in place once the economic crisis 
in Romania of mid-nineties was judged to be systemic in scope. 
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Fig. 3. Short-term action plan (STAP’s) Cycles 
 
The results of the FW are structured in two main categories: 
• Immediate ones as results of the implementation of Short Term Action Plans (STAP’s) within a 30-90 
days timeframe  
• The shutting down of production capacities in value of 600 million dollars; 
• The sale of assets of approximately 50 millions $;  
• Staff reduction of approximately 35.000 people; 
• Funds worth 170 million $ from SOF for modernization and technology upgrading; 
• Bank credits worth 300 million $;  
• Cost reductions (400 million $);  
• Cash-in improvements (600 million $); 
 
The results of the conciliation process of the commercial companies that signed the conciliation agreements 
are as follows:  
• Of the total debts of 1 billion $ 71% were recon ciliated ; 
• Of the total conciliated debts of 710 million $ , 71.8% represent rescheduled debts to the suppliers, banks 
and the state budget. 0.5% represents the reduced payment of the debts to the suppliers, banks and the 
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state budget and 27.7% represent cancellation of penalties granted by the suppliers, banks and the state 
budget. 
 
As a result of the „ shock policies” from that time, the state budget had been cleaned of a series of hidden or 
quasi-fiscal elements such as credits for the agricultural sector, indirect subsidies for the heavy industry obtained 
from the foreign exchange restrictions, and subsidies for consumers through regulated prices for energy and 
agricultural sectors. As a consequence, the increasing trend of public deficits from 1993-1996 had been stopped. 
Long-term ones as result of the finalization of the restructuring process through ownership restructuring in the 
second stage of the FW - “LARGE-SCALE PRIVATIZATION”(OWNERSHIP RESTRUCTURING” 1996-
2000; 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Implementation of comprehensive restructuring programs 
 
Naturally, starting  even with the second stage of the FW and in both stages of SW the restructuring process 
was based on a new paradigm, that ignored the involvement of the state institutions in the micromanagement of 
the process and focused on a unique element of a standard restructuring = the ownership restructuring.  
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Fig. 5. The first wave of restructuring 
 
This segregation in waves  and stages on the one hand and of the results of restructuring (in immediate-short-
term and long-term) as result of the finalization of the restructuring process through ownership restructuring in 
the second stage of the FW,  on the other hand gives us the possibility to better commensurate the effects of the 
restructuring process  in Romania. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. The stages of the 2nd wave of restructuring 
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Fig. 7. Timeline of restructuring in Romania 
 
 
Table 1. Differences between the two waves of restructuring 
 
First wave  (1993-2000) 
of restructuring process 
Second wave (2001-2012) of restructuring process 
First stage (2001-2009) Second stage (2010-2013) 
CONTENT :    400 joint stock companies Residual stock of mid and big-sized 
companies (privatization) 
National companies (former  
Regies autonomes ) 
PRINCIPLES:  “pre-privatization “restructuring  
                        followed by privatization through 
MEBO   until 1997 and direct sales (1997-2004)  
Ownership restructuring 
(privatization) 
Through direct sales and IPO’s on  
Stock exchange 
Ownership restructuring 
(privatization) 
Through IPO’s on  Stock exchange 
APPROACH: ” top-down “ for general restructuring 
MANAGEMENT: Who was running the 
restructuring process?  
State management through the Government 
institutions: Restructuring  Agency and State 
Ownership Fund 
“Top-down”  as for ownership 
restructuring and partial elements of 
the standard restructuring 
State management through the 
Government institutions:  
OPSPI  and line ministries  
Top-down”  as for ownership 
restructuring and partial elements 
of the standard restructuring 
State management through the 
Government institutions:  
OPSPI  and line ministries  
First wave  (1993-2000) 
of restructuring process 
Second wave (2001-2012) of restructuring process 
First stage (2001-2009) Second stage (2010-2013) 
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TYPES  of restructuring: STANDARD: 
 legal, ownership, operational, financial, 
technological, management. Preparing the company 
for the ownership restructuring through 
privatization 
Ownership restructuring  standard 
restructuring through mergers and 
spin-offs 
Ownership restructuring towards  
standard restructuring 
Special cases: Mergers  (Energetic 
complexes) 
LEGAL: lack of legal framework for insolvency  Legal framework for insolvency 
completed 
Legal framework for insolvency 
improved 
TYPE  of management of CC’s:  
state management 
State management changed to private 
management  through privatization 
Change to private management in 
most of cases 
The principles were agreed with IFI and included in 
the matrix of conditionality’s of “stand-by” loans 
The principles were agreed by IFI. In 
the second stage, since 2007, joined 
by  EU Commission 
The principles were agreed by  
troika: IMF, WB, and EU 
Commission 
The absence of the structured capital markets 
institutions. i.e. the Bucharest Stock Exchange and 
private banking system 
Development of Bucharest Stock 
Exchange and private banking 
system 
New stage in Bucharest Stock 
Exchange : listed Fondul 
Proprietatea and  several IPO’s 
(Transelectrica, Transgaz, 
Romgaz, Nuclearelectrica etc) 
Fig. 8. A graphical representation of the difference between the two waves of restructuring 
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Fig. 9. First stage types of restructuring 
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Fig. 10. Second stage types of restructuring 
 
 
4. The impact of restructuring on macro and micro aggregates  
Based on the segregation that we stated, we have set up and computed correlations with: Real GDP, FDI and 
exports, BET index and EBRD: large scale privatization index, small scale privatization index, government and 
enterprise restructuring index. 
Fig. 11. Evolution of GDP during the waves of restructuring 
 
 
1300   Dumitru Dan Popescu and Costin Ciora /  Procedia Economics and Finance  32 ( 2015 )  1289 – 1304 
Fig. 12. Evolution of BET index, exports and FDI during the waves of restructuring 
 
 
Fig. 13. EBRD indexes during the two waves 
 
5. Correlations for restructuring 
In order to study the direct correlation between and privatization we used the data provided by EBRD for 
Romania since 1992, which calculates two important indexes: Privatization index and Government and enterprise 
Restructuring Index. Thus, we applied the Pearson correlation coefficient according to the model.  
 
 
ݎ = ݊
(σݔݕ) െ (σݔ)(σݕ )
ඥ[݊σݔଶ െ (σݔ)ଶ][݊σݕଶ െ (σݕ)ଶ]
 
 
As starting form a function: y=mx + b, we calculated the slope and independent variable. Slope means that 
a unit change in x, the independent variable will result in a change in y by the amount of b. 
 
Our findings are: 
 
EBRD Priv index= 1.349 * Gov and entr. Restr. + 0.097 
 
Pearson Correlation coefficient ( r )= 0.8537 
 
There is a high positive correlation between the increase of the privatization index provided by EBRD and 
the Government & Enterprise restructuring index. A unit increase in Government & enterprise restructuring index 
1301 Dumitru Dan Popescu and Costin Ciora /  Procedia Economics and Finance  32 ( 2015 )  1289 – 1304 
will mean a 1.349 increase in Privatization index. There is an amplification of the actual restructuring towards 
ownership restructuring. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14. Evolution of revenues and profit of selected companies 
 
Further, we assessed the case of three important Romanian companies that had an ownership restructuring: 
one through privatization and the others two through IPO. We followed the evolution of three indicators: net 
revenues, gross profit and net profit. After the change in ownership (whether this was the result of an IPO of 
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stock listing or the result of privatization), the company trend was positive. In the same time, we analyzed profit 
margin of this three companies and we noticed increasing values after privatization or IPO. 
Fig. 15. Comparison of profit margin for selected companies 
Furthermore, we increased our sample with 17 companies that were privatized during 1997 till 2008, at a total 
value of 7.7 bln.euro. We calculated the weight of value of privatization to the GDP volume (*%Val of 
priv/GDP), which was correlated with the real GDP growth rate.  
 
Table 2. Selection of companies privatized between 1997 and 2008 
 
Year 
GDP - bln. 
Euro 
Real GDP 
variation 
Ownership restructuring (Privatization) companies 
Val of privatization (bln. 
Euro) 
% Val of 
priv/GDP* 
1997 31.3 -6.00% Romcim 0.165 0.528% 
1998 37.4 -4.80% Romtelecom 0.558 1.492% 
1999 33.5 -1.10% BRD, Dacia 0.206 0.616% 
2000 40.3 2.90% Rompetrol Rafinare 0.049 0.122% 
2001 44.9 5.50% Sidex 0.074 0.165% 
2002 48.5 5.00% Alro, Rafo 0.020 0.042% 
2004 60.8 8.50% Petrom, Distrigaz Sud 1.610 2.648% 
2005 79.5 4.20% 
Distrigaz Nord, Electrica Oltenia, Electrica 
Moldova 0.866 1.089% 
2006 97.7 7.90% BCR 3.750 3.838% 
2007 123.7 6.30% Electroputere, Automobile Craiova 0.059 0.048% 
2008 139.7 7.30% Electrica Muntenia Sud 0.395 0.283% 
*%Val of priv/GDP = value of privatization/GDP volume 
 
By using the Pearson Correlation coefficient we wanted to see the influence of weight of value of privatization 
to the GDP volume on the Real GDP growth rate.  
The findings are presented below 
 
Real GDP variation = 0.694 * %Val of priv/GDP + 0.0553 
 
Pearson Correlation coefficient = 0.66 
 
There is a moderate correlation, as a unit increase of %val of priv/GDP will mean a 0.694 increase in Real 
GDP variation. Thus, this validates our idea that restructuring effects are more accurate on a long-term basis 
 
6. Conclusions  
A change of restructuring paradigm: switching from “pre-privatization restructuring” to “ownership 
restructuring” starting with the second stage of FW 
This segregation in waves  and stages on the one hand and of the results of restructuring( in immediate -short-
term and long-term as  result of the finalization of the restructuring process through ownership restructuring in 
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the second stage of the FW, on the other hand gives us the possibility to better quantify the effects of the 
restructuring process in Romania. 
A key result is that the effects of restructuring in both waves are positive, which provides evidence in support 
of the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, while at the same time some relevance of the efficient-structure 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. Large-scale restructuring was a process both useful and efficient. Djankov 
conclusion (that the large scale restructuring process had no results) was made on a methodological error, because 
the first FRP were set up in 1995-1996, and the results of  the implementation of an FRP  is measurable and 
relevant  on a short –term  basis (30-90 days) cumulated  with medium and long term (2-5 years) that escaped 
from his calculation (his data base was consisting in 1992-1996 period, and  cumulated effects were not yet 
visible). Delayed results of privatization that crystallized by the end of first wave did not deny the principles that 
governed the first wave of restructuring process. Residual stock of mid and big companies that entered the 
restructuring process in the first wave where privatized in the second wave (first stage). Significant improvement 
of macroeconomic results (GDP, FDI and exports) and stock exchange (BET index) in the second wave of 
restructuring. 
The correlations showed us high correlation in terms of impact of government and enterprise restructuring on 
privatization and also moderate correlation in terms of effects. The restructuring process must be seen on long 
term basis, as its effects are correlated with the macroeconomic results. 
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